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Abstract
The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is intro-
duced. Neo-additive capacities model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncer-
tainty as observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities can
be applied easily in economic problems, as we demonstrate by examples. This paper pro-
vides an axiomatisation of Choquet expected utility with neo-capacities in a framework
of purely subjective uncertainty.
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‘‘That the chance of gain is naturally over-valued we may
learn from the universal success of lotteries. [...] The vain
hope of gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause of
this demand. The soberest people scarce look upon it as a
folly to pay a small sum for the chance of gaining ten or twen-
ty thousand pounds.’
Adam Smith (1776)
‘‘The Wealth of Nations’’ (p.210).
“Overconfidence, however generated, appears to be a funda-
mental factor promoting the high volume of trade we observe
in speculative markets. Without such confidence, one would
think that there would be little trading in financial markets.
Robert Shiller (2001)
“Irrational Exuberance” (p.144/5).
1. Introduction
Optimism and pessimism are important features of a person’s attitude towards uncertainty.
On an aggregate level, business cycles and stock market fluctuations have been attributed
to “irrational” optimism and pessimism. Economic theory, however, finds it difficult to
see in such moods a major factor determining economic behavior. With large amounts of
money and wealth at stake, as in the investment behavior of traders in financial markets,
one hesitates to attribute major influence on decisions to vague notions of belief.
Faced with uncertainty economists like to think of investors as cool analysts, carefully
weighing likelihoods of events relevant for their decisions. Yet, many observers of in-
vestment behavior in financial markets, from Keynes (1921) to Robert Shiller
(2001), could not escape the conclusion that psychological effects seem to interact with
probabilistic information in shaping investors’ behavior.
Embracing Ramsey’s (1926) and de Finetti’s (1937) personalistic view of proba-
bility, Savage (1954) provided a set of behavioral postulates showing that it is possible
to view decision makers’ behavior in the face of uncertainty as guided by a consistent
system of probabilistic beliefs. His axioms gave researchers an opportunity to put these
postulates to direct tests. Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1962) were the most promi-
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nent articles reportingchoice behavior of people which contradicts Savage’s postulates. In
particular, the Sure-Thing-Principle which allows one to decompose a decision problem,
omitting ‘‘equivalent parts’’ and focussing choice on the remaining parts, was quickly
identified as especially problematic.
There are behavioral regularities which inf luence individuals’ betting behavior. People
distinguish categorically between situations which they consider as certain, just possible,
or strictly impossible. These consistently observed certainty and impossibility effects
cannot be modeled by a transition from zero probability of an event to a positive proba-
bility, or from a positive probability to the probability of one.
A typical lottery with a high prize on a very unlikely event can turn the certainty of low
wealth for a poor person into the possibility of great riches, providing a reason for ac-
cepting an unfair gamble. Conversely, rich people may find the possibility of loosing
substantial amounts of wealth so dangerous that high expected returns are necessary to
induce them to an investment.
Bell (1985) interprets these psychological biases as disappointment aversion or elation-
seeking behavior. He studies situations where these biases determine the behavior, such
as the process of releasing information, behavior in auctions and the Ellsberg paradox.
Based on these observations he argues for an inverse-S shaped pattern of decision weights
as an adequate representation of individual attitudes towards uncertainty.
Optimistic behavior overestimates the likelihood of good outcomes while pessimistic at-
titudes exaggerate the likelihood of bad outcomes. Based upon mounting experimental
evidence for certainty and impossibility effects, Wakker (2001) extends these no-
tions to arbitrary events with rank-ordered outcomes and characterizes optimistic and
pessimistic attitudes. In the context of the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model, con-
cave capacities ref lect optimistic attitudes towards uncertainty, while convex capacities
model pessimism.
1.1 Experimental evidence
Camerer (1995) reviews numerous studies refuting the validity of the expected utility
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approach as a description of individual behavior. More recently, however, experiments
find evidence for typical patterns of deviation from the expected utility model. In par-
ticular, one often observes subjects willing to bet on high outcomes with low probability
while refusing to accept even small risks. For subjects choosing between lotteries, one can
explain such behavior by a function w(p) weighting the probability p of events. Experi-
mental studies by Gonzalez & Wu (1999), Abdellaoui (2000), Bleichrodt
& Pinto (2000) and others show a pattern of probability weights as in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Probability weighting function
The decision weight of an event E , w(p(E)), measured by the willingness to bet on this
event, differs usually from the probability of the event p(E): Figure 1 shows an inverse-S
shaped weighting function, overweighting probabilities close to zero and underweight-
ing probabilities close to one as. Tversky & Wakker (1995) study the relationship
between decision weights and attitudes towards risk and characterize the possibility and
certainty effects. Wakker (2001) defines optimism and pessimism in terms of decision
weights. This article contains also a brief survey of the relevant experimental literature.
Kilka & Weber (2001) demonstrate how decision weights and subjective probabilis-
tic beliefs can be distinguished in experiments.
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1.2 Axiomatic treatments
A simple version of an inverse-S shaped weighting function w(p);
w(p) :=
8<: 1 for p = 1¸+ (1 ¡¸ ¡ °) ¢ p for 0 < p < 10 for p = 0 ;
is depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Neo-additive capacity
This weighting scheme, which we call neo-additive capacity for reasons explained below,
has a simple Choquet integral. Integrating over a lottery yields a weighted average of the
expected utility of the lottery and its maximal and minimal outcomes.
In the context of choice of objective lotteries there are a few studies providing behav-
ioral axioms for functionals which combine expected utility with minimum utility and
maximum utility approach. Gilboa (1988) and Jaffray (1988) independently ax-
iomatize a functional which aggregates the expected utility functional and the minimum
utility functional in a monotonic function. Their representations capture only pessimistic
attitudes towards uncertainty. Cohen (1992), in contrast, provides axioms for a repre-
sentation of preferences over lotteries as a weighted average of expected utility, minimum
utility and maximum utility. For the context of choice over lotteries, her paper provides
the behavioral foundations for the representation studied in this paper. To our knowledge
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there is no axiomatization for choice over acts in either the Anscombe-Aumann or the
Savage framework.
The neo-additive weighting scheme provides an easy way to model the certainty and
the impossibility effects. Combined with a probability function Pr (:) over ranges of
monetary outcomes, this weighting scheme models an individual who overweights the
likelihood of a monetary outcome x exceeding x;
w(Pr(x > x)) = ¸+ (1¡ ¸ ¡ °) ¢ Pr(x > x)
> Pr(x > x);
whenever Pr(x > x) < ¸= (¸+ °) : In contrast, outcomes below x occurring with low
probability Pr(x · x) obtain a weight,
w(Pr(x · x)) ´ 1 ¡ w(1 ¡ Pr(x > x))
= (1 ¡¸)¡ (1 ¡¸ ¡ °) (Pr(x · x))
> Pr(x · x);
whenever Pr(x · x) < °= (¸ + °).
In the next section, we introduce some notation and concepts necessary for our analysis.
Section 3 studies the neo-additive weighting scheme in the context of the CEU model.
This parameterized CEU model can be easily applied to economic models in order to
analyse the implications of the certainty and impossibility effect. Section 4 illustrates the
potential of the neo-additive CEU representation for economic applications in the context
of a portfolio choice model. Section 5 provides an axiomatic treatment of neo-additive
capacities in a framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Proofs are collected in an
appendix.
2. Capacities and the Choquet integral
We assume that the uncertainty a decision maker faces can be described by a non-empty
set of states, denoted by S. This set may be finite or infinite. Associated with the set
of states is the set of events, taken to be a sigma-algebra of subsets of S , denoted by E :
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We assume that for each s in S , fsg is in E . Capacities are real-valued functions defined
on E , that generalize the notion of probability distributions. Formally, a capacity is a
normalized monotone set function.
Definition 2.1 A capacity is a function º : E ! R which assigns real numbers to
events, such that
(i) E;F 2 E ; E µ F implies º(E) 6 º(F ); monotonicity
(ii) º(;) = 0 and º(S) = 1: normalization
A capacity º is called convex if º(E [F ) ¸ º(E)+º(F )¡º(E \F ) holds for arbitrary
eventsE;F 2 E : If the reverse inequality holds then the capacity is called concave. Prob-
ability distributions are special cases of capacities which are both concave and convex.
For each capacity º there is a dual or conjugate capacity º defined by º (E) = 1 ¡
º (S ¡ E) for allE 2 E : If the dual capacity º is convex, then the capacityº is concave.
The most common way to integrate functions with respect to a capacity is the Choquet
integral. Let f : S ! R be a E-measurable real-valued function. We consider finite
outcome acts and suppose that f has finite range, that is, the set f(S) is finite. We call
a function f with these properties a simple function. The Choquet integral can therefore
be written in the following intuitive form.
Definition 2.2 For any simple function f the Choquet integral with respect to the ca-
pacity º is defined as
V (fjº) = P
u2f(S)
u ¢ [º (fsj f (s) ¸ ug) ¡ º (fsj f(s) > ug)] :
Each element in the range has a decision weight equal to the difference between the capac-
ity of the states yielding an element better or equal than the one under consideration and
the capacity of the states yielding a strictly better outcome. The Choquet integral is inter-
preted as the expected value of the function f with respect to the capacity º: The decision
weights used in the computation of the Choquet integral will overweight high outcomes
if the capacity is concave and will overweight low outcomes if the capacity is convex. It
is therefore well-suited to model such responses to ambiguity as optimism or pessimism.
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Sarin & Wakker (1998) provide a detailed discussion of decision weights.
3. Neo-additive capacities
Choquet expected utility (CEU) maximisers will never bet on events E 2 E with capacity
value º(E) = 0; nor will they bet against events F 2 E with capacity value º(F ) = 1:
An event with capacity value zero will therefore never inf luence the choice of a CEU
decision maker and can be called a null event. Similarly, an event with capacity value of
one will be called universal event. For probability distributions, the complement of a null
event will necessarily be a universal event. For general capacities, this is not true except
for the empty set and its complement, the state space S: As Example 3.1 below illustrates,
it is useful to allow for other null events with complements which are universal.
Let Z 2 E be the largest null event in E such that S¡Z is universal. Since capacities are
monotonic, every event E ½ Z must also be a null event and S¡Emust be universal. All
these events will have a capacity value of zero and the capacity value of their complement
is one. In many cases, Z = ; is the largest set with these properties.
In this section we introduce a special kind of capacity which we call a neo-additive ca-
pacity because it is additive on non-extreme outcomes, if these occur on essential events.
Neo-additive capacities can be viewed as a convex combination of an additive capacity
and two capacities, one of which ref lects complete ignorance or complete ambiguity,
denoted ¹0, and another which ref lects complete confidence, denoted ¹1.
Definition 3.1 For all E 2 E ,
¹0(E) :=
½
1 for S ¡ E µ Z
0 otherwise , ¹
1(E) :=
½
0 for E µ Z
1 otherwise :
The capacity ¹0 is convex. The capacity ¹1 is the conjugate of ¹0, that is ¹1(E) = 1 ¡
¹0(S ¡ E) for all E in E , and therefore is concave.
Let ¼ be a finitely additive probability distribution defined over E , such that ¼ (A) = 0
for all A µ Z and ¼ (B) = 1 for all S ¡ B µ Z . Denote by ¢ := f(®; ¯)j ® ¸ 0;
¯ ¸ 0; ® + ¯ · 1g the simplex in R2:
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Definition 3.2 For a given finitely additive probability distribution ¼ on (S; E) with
¼(E) = 0 for E µ Z , and a pair of numbers (°; ¸) 2 ¢, a neo-additive capacity
º(¢j¼; °; ¸) is defined as
º(Ej¼; °; ¸) := ° ¢ ¹0(E) + ¸ ¢ ¹1(E) + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼(E)
for all E in E.
It is straightforward to derive the Choquet integral of a simple function f with respect
to a neo-additive capacity in terms a weighted sum of the act’s infimum over S ¡ Z , its
supremum over S ¡ Z and its expectation with respect to ¼.
Lemma 3.1 The Choquet expected value of a simple function f : S ! R with respect
to the neo-additive capacity º(Ej¼; °; ¸) is given by:
V (f jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) := °¢ inf
S¡Z f + ¸¢ supS¡Z f + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ E¼ [f ] : (1)
Proof. To see this note that V (f j¹0) = inf
S¡Z f V (f j¹1) = supS¡Z f and V (fj¼) = E¼ [f ] :
The result then follows from the linearity of the Choquet integral with respect to the
capacity (Denneberg (2000), Properties (ix) and (x) on page 49).
Notice that we do not require that ¼ (E) = 0 implies E to be null. Indeed nothing in the
definitions above rule out Z = ?; and hence S to be the only universal event in E. In this
case, if for some event E 6= ;, ¼ (E) = 0, º (E) = ¸ is positive and º (S ¡ E) = 1¡ °
is less than one. That is, an event E may receive a zero decision weight in the evaluation
of the Choquet expected value for any act with neither its infimum nor its supremum on
E: If the infimum (respectively, supremum) occurs in a state of E; however, the decision
weight on E is ° (respectively, ¸). For further illustration of this point, consider the
following example.
Example 3.1 Suppose S is the unit interval, [0; 1], E is the Borel sigma algebra and
¼ a uniform distribution. If a decision maker is only willing to bet on states in [0:5; 1];
considering states in [0; 0:5) impossible, one can model such beliefs and behaviour by
the maximal null event Z = [0;0:5) and ¼ the uniform distribution on [0:5; 1]. Clearly,
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¼(s) = 0 for all s 2 S; yet º(s) = 0 for s 2 [0; 0:5) and º(s) = ¸ for s 2 [0:5; 1]:
Moreover, though ¼(S ¡ fsg) = 1 for all s 2 S; we have º(S ¡ fsg) = 1 ¡ ° for all
s 2 [0:5; 1]; since S ¡ (S ¡ fsg) = fsg * Z in this case.
Example 3.1 shows also that an event as fsg may matter for the decision maker if the best
or worst outcome is associated with it, even if it has probability zero.
Several well-known decision criteria can be viewed as special cases of the Choquet in-
tegral of a neo-additive capacity:
(i) ° = ¸ = 0 expected utility,
(ii) 1 ¸ ° > 0; ¸ = 0 pure pessimism,
(iii) ° = 0; 1 ¸ ¸ > 0 pure optimism,
(iv) ° + ¸ = 1 Hurwitz criterion.
Neo-additive capacities satisfy three conditions:
² They are additive for pairs of events which are not null and do not form a partition of
a universal event.
² They exhibit uncertainty aversion for some events.
² They exhibit uncertainty preference for some other events.
Indeed, as the following proposition shows, these conditions characterize neo-additive
capacities completely.
Proposition 3.1 Let º be a capacity on (S; E); where E contains at least three pairwise
disjoint events E1, E2 and E3 with 0 < º(Ei) < 1 for i = 1; 2; 3: Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) º is a neo-additive capacity,
(ii) the capacity º satisfies the following properties:
(a) for any three events (E;F;G) 2 E £ E £ E such that E \ F = ; = E \G;
º(E [ F ) < 1 and º(E [G) < 1;
º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ) = º(E [G) ¡ º(G);
(b) for some (E;F ) 2 E £ E such that E \ F = ; and º(E [ F ) < 1;
º(E [ F ) · º(E) + º(F );
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(c) for some (E;F ) 2 E £ E such that E \ F = ; and º(E [ F ) < 1;
º(E [ F ) · º(E) + º(F ):
Proof. Appendix.
Note that for a neo-additive capacity º on (S; E); where E contains at least three non-
null events, as assumed throughout the paper, uniqueness of the pessimism and optimism
coefficients (°; ¸) and of the underlying probability measure ¼ is guaranteed. This is
proved in a lemma preceding the proof of Proposition 3.1 in the appendix.
Property (iia) establishes additivity of the neo-additive capacity for events that yield non-
extreme outcomes. According to property (iib), the capacity overweights the event in
which the most preferred prize is obtained, hence ¸ ¸ 0: Property (iic) says the capacity
overweights also the event with the least preferred prize. It implies ° ¸ 0:
3.1 Optimism and pessimism
In this section we will provide two arguments why one may be justified to interpret the
overweighting of the extreme outcomes with the notions of optimism and pessimism. The
first argument shows that neo-additivecapacities are a special caseof the behavioural con-
cept of optimism and pessimism advanced in Wakker (2001). The second argument
appeals to the intuitive notion of optimism and pessimism suggested by the context of the
multiple prior approach.
3.1.1 The behavioural approach of Wakker (2001)
Inspired by the Allais and Ellsberg paradox, Wakker (2001) suggests a notion of op-
timism and pessimism based on choice behaviour over acts. This approach derives its
appeal from its immediate testability in experiments and its natural representation by
properties of capacities.
Properties (iib) and (iic) of Proposition 3.1 imply the neo-additive capacity to be concave
on some events, which corresponds to the notion of optimism suggested in Wakker
(2001), and convex on some others, hence pessimistic in the sense ofWakker (2001).
To see this, consider the following four acts f1; f2; f3; f4 defined on a partition of the state
space (B;A; I; L) with real outcomes M > m > 0.
11
B A I L
f1 M m m 0
f2 M M 0 0
f3 m m m m
f4 m M 0 m
(*)
Assume that m is chosen such that V (f1) = V (f2):Wakker (2001) calls a decision
maker pessimistic if V (f3) > V (f4) and optimistic if V (f3) < V (f4): Of course, an
expected utility maximiser must be indifferent between f3 and f4:
If the decision maker is indifferent between acts f1 and f2; thenmmeasures the willing-
ness to pay for the gamble M on A and 0 on I conditional on the gamble M on B and
0 on L: If f3 is preferred to f4; then the gamble M on A and 0 on I is worth less than
m because there is no chance of losing in event L: This special attention given to bad
outcomes is associated with pessimism. In contrast, an optimist, will be willing to pay
more for the gambleM on A and 0 on I if there is no chance of winning in event B:
Consider aneo-additive capacity º(¢j¼; °; ¸):FromV (f1jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) = V (f2jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)),
we conclude that
(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ [m ¢ ¼(A) +m ¢ ¼(I )] = (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢M ¢ ¼(A):
It turns out that neo-additive capacities exhibit pessimism for some acts and optimism
for others.
Case (i): pessimism
V (f3jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) > V (f4jº(¢j¼;°; ¸)) implies ° > 0; since simple computations show
that V (f3jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) > V (f4jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) if and only ifm ¢ (° + ¸) > ¸ ¢M: Hence,
° > 0: Moreover, it is straightforward that V (f3jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) > V (f4jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) for
any M > m > 0 is equivalent to ¸ = 0 and ° > 0; i.e., pure pessimism.
Case (ii): optimism
Similarly,V (f3jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) < V (f4jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) implies ¸ > 0, and V (f3jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) <
V (f4jº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) for any M > m > 0 is equivalent to ° = 0 and ¸ > 0; i.e., pure op-
timism.
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Neo-additive capacities show both optimism and pessimism as they relate to the certainty
and the impossibility effect1.
3.1.2 The multiple-prior approach
The multiple-prior approach assumes that uncertainty of a decision maker can be repre-
sented by a set of probability distributions D: The evaluation of an act is the expected
utility with respect to the probability distributions in the set D: Attitudes towards the
ambiguity about the correct probability distribution can then be captured by the weights
which the decision maker puts on the best or worst expected utility over the set D:
Without loss of generality, but for the ease of exposition, assume there is a finite set of
statesS = f1; :::; ng: The set of probability distributions over S is the simplex ¢n in this
case. Let the set of probability distributions D µ ¢n;which the decision maker considers
possible, be compact and convex. In the multiple-prior approach preferences over acts
(x1; :::; xn) are represented by the preference functional
V(x1; :::; xnj®;D) := ®¢ mine¼2D
"X
s2S
u(xs) ¢ e¼s# + (1 ¡ ®)¢ maxe¼2D
"X
s2S
u(xs) ¢ e¼s# :
The parameter ® 2 [0; 1] represents the weight given to the worst expected utility and
(1 ¡ ®) is the weight given to the best expected utility. Optimism corresponds to the
weight given the best expected utility and pessimism to the weight given the worst ex-
pected utility. A nice feature of this approach is the natural separation between ambiguity,
reflected by the set D; and attitudes towards ambiguity, ref lected by the degrees of pes-
simism ® and optimism (1 ¡ ®):
The Choquet expected utility of a neo-additive capacity defined in Equation 1 can be
viewed as a multiple-prior expected utility. Applied to the case of a finite state space, it
is not difficult to verify the following equality:
V (x1; :::; xnjº(¢j¼; °; ¸)) :=
1 They are cavex in the sense of Wakker (2001, p. 1049), that is concave for events which are
revealed unlikely and convex for events which are revealed as likely.
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°¢ min
s2S u(xs) + ¸¢ maxs2S u(xs) + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢
"X
s2S
u(xs) ¢ ¼s
#
= °
° + ¸
¢ mine¼2D
"X
s2S
u(xs) ¢ e¼s# + ¸° + ¸ ¢ maxe¼2D
"X
s2S
u(xs) ¢ e¼s#
= : V(x1; :::; xnj °° + ¸;D);
with
D := fe¼ 2 ¢nj e¼s ¸ (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼s; s 2 Sg :
Note that the set of probabilities D is convex and compact. Moreover, it has a nice geo-
metric structure as Figure 3 illustrates for the case of n = 3: For a neo-additive capacity
q
qq
~¼1 = 1 ~¼2 = 1
~¼3 = 1
s¼
Figure 3: Multiple priors
º(¢j¼; °; ¸) the set of possible probability distributions D is centered around the proba-
bility distribution ¼ and has a size determined by ° + ¸: Hence, ° + ¸ can be viewed
as the degree of ambiguity about the additive probability distribution ¼: The degree of
pessimism °°+¸ and the degree of optimism
¸
°+¸ measure the decision maker’s attitude
towards this ambiguity. Thus, neo-additive capacities have also a natural interpretation
in the context of the multiple-prior approach.
It is well-known that the Choquet expected utility approach is equivalent to the multiple
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prior approach if capacities are convex. In general however, neo-additive capacities are
neither convex nor concave. The multiple-prior representation of the Choquet integral of
neo-additive capacities is a special case of the more general multiple prior-representation
axiomatised recently by Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2002) and is
similar to the ®-maxmin expected utility approach of Kopylov (2002).
4. Economic Applications
The ups and downs of economic activity during the business cycle which are usually
accompanied by swings in investors’ sentiments, ranging from bull to bear spirits in fi-
nancial markets, provide numerous examples of the impact of uncertainty on economic
behavior.
Neo-additive capacities provide a natural way for modelling optimism and pessimism
influencing economic activities. The parameters of a neo-additive capacity can be inter-
preted as measuring confidence in beliefs and degrees of optimism and pessimism. A
neo-additive capacity º(E j¼; °; ¸) is based on an additive probability distribution ¼ re-
f lecting the subjective beliefs of the decision maker. It represents an assessment of the
likelihood of events consistent with the individual’s belief. The weight (1¡ ° ¡¸) given
to ¼ is a measure of the degree of confidence which the individual holds in this belief. The
core belief of a neo-additive capacity represented by the additive probability distribution
¼ can be determined endogenously in equilibrium2 . Thus, standard equilibrium analysis
is always the special case of full confidence, ° = ¸ = 0:
Positive parameters ° and ¸ represent the impact of pessimism and optimism respec-
tively. Neo-additive capacities can therefore model psychological phenomena such as
excessive optimism and pessimism which have been put forward as explanations for eco-
nomic behavior in depressions or bubbles and which have been confirmed in laboratory
experiments.
In this section we show by example that optimism and pessimism can explain behavior
2 Eichberger & Kelsey (2000) provide a thorough analysis of strategic games when beliefs are
modelled as non-additive capacities.
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inconsistent with expected utility maximization. In theses cases, optimism and pessimism
can help to explain well-known economic puzzles. We will reconsider the paradox of
people buying insurance and gambling, and we will review portfolio choice behavior
where one observes unreasonably high risk premia (the equity premium puzzle ) and a
willingness to invest in high-risk stock of unknown start-up companies (the small stock
puzzle ).
4.1 Insurance and gambling
The same individual is often observed to buy both insurance against risk and lottery tick-
ets. As our introductory quotation of Adam Smith illustrates, such behavior is ubiquitous
but hard to reconcile with rational decision making based on probabilistic calculus. For
expected utility maximizers with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function such be-
havior is hard to explain.3 Buying insurance suggests a preference for reduced risk, while
paying for a lottery implies preference for a risky gamble, often at very unfair odds.
To see how both types of behavior can be accommodated by a neo-additive capacity,
consider an individual endowed with wealth x, whose preferences over lotteries can be
represented by the Choquet expected utility of a neo-additive capacity, with parameters
° > ¸ ¸ 0 for the neo-additive capacity and utility index u (taken to be concave). This
individual faces a (small) probability ¼L of incurring a loss of size L. Insurance coverage
is available at a premium q. Also available at a price p is a lottery ticket that ‘wins’ with
(a very small ) probability ¼W and pays out the single prize of size W and otherwise
pays out nothing. Suppose that the individual views the event in which he incurs the loss
and the event in which he wins the lottery (should he purchase a ticket) are independent.
Further suppose that [° + (1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼L] ¢ L > q ¸ ¼L ¢ L: The weak inequality is a
feasibility condition for the insurance premium to cover at least the expected loss (and if
strict it means that the insurance coverage is actuarially unfair). The strict inequality is
satisfied if the individual has a positive degree of pessimism ° and if the potential loss
3 Friedman & Savage (1948) suggest an S-shaped von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
This approach to reconcile such behaviour has been critisised by Markowitz (1952). See Hirsh-
leifer & Riley (1992) for a discussion of the Friedman-Savage approach (pp. 26-28).
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L is sufficiently large.
The difference in the Choquet expected utilities between buying and not buying the in-
surance is
u (x¡ q)¡ ([¸+ (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ (1¡ ¼L)] ¢ u (x) + [° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼L] ¢ u (x¡ L))
¸ u (x¡ q)¡ u ([¸ + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ (1 ¡¼L)] ¢ x + [° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼L] ¢ (x¡ L))
= u (x¡ q)¡ u (x¡ [° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¼L]L) > 0
The first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality applied to the convex function ¡u,
and the second inequality follows from monotonicity of u. Figure 4 illustrates the desir-
ability of purchase of full coverage at the unfair premium for the case where u is affine.
slope: ¡ °+(1¡°¡ )¸¼L¸+(1¡°¡¸)(1¡¼L)
0
purchase of insurance
no accident
accident
...........................................
s
s.......................
....................
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Figure 4: Insurance
Having purchased the insurance, the difference in Choquet expected utilities between
buying the lottery ticket and not may now be expressed as
[¸ + (1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼W ] ¢ u (x+W ¡ p¡ q)
+[° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ (1 ¡ ¼W )] ¢ u (x¡ p¡ q)¡ u (x¡ q)
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> ¸ ¢ u (x+W ¡ p ¡ q) + (1 ¡ ¸) ¢ u (x¡ p ¡ q) ¡ u (x ¡ q)
¸ ¸ ¢ [u (x +W ¡ p¡ q) ¡ u (x¡ q)]¡ p ¢ u0 (x¡ q) :
The last inequality follows from the concavity of u: For ¸ > 0 and u strictly increasing,
there is a lottery (W;¼W ; p)withW highenough and¼W small enoughsuch that¼W ¢W <
p and
¸ ¢ [u (x +W ¡ p¡ q) ¡ u (x¡ q)]
p
> u0 (x¡ q) :
Notice that this is true for any degree of concavity of u: Optimism makes lotteries with
high prizes and low probabilities of winning attractive even for individuals who are averse
to accepting actuarially fair fifty-fifty gambles. Figure 5 illustrates the desirability of the
purchase of an unfair lottery ticket for the case where u is affine.
purchase of a lottery ticket
lose lottery
s
s
.........
........
x¡ q
x¡ q
x¡ q ¡ p
x +W ¡ q ¡ p
slope: ¡ ¸+(1¡°¡¸)¼W°+(1¡°¡ )¸(1¡¼W )
slope: ¡ ¼W1¡¼W
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C
C
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Figure 5: Gambling
4.2 Portfolio choice
There are numerous puzzles in portfolio choice theory. Thaler (2000) provides a
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stimulating exposition of some well-known irregularities. These puzzles highlight incon-
sistencies between standard economic theories and empirical regularities. Naturally, not
all can be related to optimism or pessimism. The following two puzzles however can be
explained easily by a small degree of optimism and pessimism.
The equity premium puzzle refers to the large difference between the average return on a
stock portfolio and the return of a fixed interest bearing bond which was first noted by
Mehra & Prescott (1985). The implied risk premium appears to be too big to be
explained by risk aversion as modelled by a concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. The conservative behavior in the face of uncertainty suggested by such a high
risk premium stands in stark contrast to the observation that small firms with high-risk
stocks seem to attract investors’ interest more than is warranted by their average returns.
To invest in stock of young ‘‘promising’’ companies appears to be extraordinarily risky.
Yet such uncertainty did not deter investors who otherwise requested a surprisingly high
risk premium.
We study a simple financial market system with a representative investor, one risky and
one riskless asset and an exogenous supply of assets. This framework suffices to illustrate
the impact of optimism and pessimism on portfolio choice. With well-known modifica-
tions these results carry over to more general models of financial markets.
Consider an investor with initial wealth W0 who can invest in two assets, a stock with
uncertain returns and a bond with a certain payoff. The following table summarizes the
notation of the assets.
asset quantity price payoff in state s 2 S
stock a q rs
bond b 1 r
Preferences of the investor are represented by a Choquet expected utility V (W1; :::;WS)
of end-of-period wealth,Ws = rs ¢ a + r ¢ b; with respect to a neo–additive capacity
V (W1; :::;WS)
:= ° ¢ minfu(W1); :::; u(WS)g + ¸ ¢ maxfu(W1); :::; u(WS)g
+(1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u(Ws):
Using the budget constraint, W0 = q ¢ a + b; to substitute for the bond, one gets wealth
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as a function of stock transactions a,
Ws = r ¢W0 + [rs¡ q ¢ r] ¢ a:
Denoting by r = maxfr1; :::; rSg and r = minfr1; :::; rSg the maximal and minimal
returns of the risky stock, one can write the Choquet expected utility from a stock invest-
ment a > 0 as
V (a) := ° ¢ u(r ¢W0 + [r ¡ q ¢ r] ¢ a)
+¸ ¢ u(r ¢W0 + [r ¡ q ¢ r] ¢ a)
+(1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u(r ¢W0 + [rs¡ q ¢ r] ¢ a):
For a stock market equilibrium price q¤ with an aggregate endowment of equity A > 0
and bonds B = 0 where the single investor maximizes Choquet expected utility V (a);
V 0(A) = ° ¢ u0(r ¢W0 + [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r] ¢ A) ¢ [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r]
+¸ ¢ u0(r ¢W0+ [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r] ¢ A) ¢ [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r]
+(1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(r ¢W0 + [rs ¡ q¤ ¢ r] ¢ A) ¢ [rs¡ q¤ ¢ r] = 0
must hold in equilibrium. Substituting for the initial wealthW0 = q¤ ¢A; this equilibrium
condition can be solved explicitly for the equilibrium stock price q¤;
q¤ =
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r + ¸ ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) ¢ rs
r ¢
·
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) + ¸ ¢ u0(r ¢ A) + (1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸ : (*)
The case of subjective expected utility, ° = ¸ = 0; is the reference situation against
which we can assess the impact of optimism or pessimism. Denote by q¤0 the equity price
in this case,
q¤0 =
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) ¢ rs
r¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) :
The equity premium is defined as the ratio
®(q¤) :=
P
s2S
¼s ¢ rs
q¤ ¢ r :
The smaller q¤ the greater the equity premium.
Consider first the case of a risk-neutral investor, u0(¢) = k: In this case, the equilibrium
stock price equals the discounted expected return of the stock plus an optimism and pes-
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simism related premium
q¤ =
P
s2S
¼s ¢ rs
r
+
° ¢
µ
r¡ P
s2S
¼s ¢ rs
¶
+ ¸ ¢
µ
r¡ P
s2S
¼s ¢ rs
¶
r
= q¤0 +
1
r
¢ [° ¢ (r ¡ E¼rs) + ¸ ¢ (r ¡ E¼rs)] ;
where we denote the expected return of the stock by E¼rs :=P
s2S
¼s ¢ rs:
Sincer > E¼rs > r; optimism will add apositive premium, ¸¢(r ¡ E¼rs) ; to the reference
price q¤0; while pessimism will make the premium negative, ° ¢ (r ¡ E¼rs) : For a risk-
neutral investor, we can note that
² the equity premium will be the higher the more pessimistic the investor is, i.e. the
smaller °;
² if there is no optimism, ¸ = 0; then the equity premium required by a pessimistic
investor will be strictly higher than the one based on the subjective probability distri-
bution ¼ alone, ®(q¤) > ®(q¤0);
² if both optimism and pessimism prevail, but ° > ¸ as in most experimental studies,
then a sufficient condition for an equity premium ®(q¤) exceeding ®(q¤0) is an average
return exceeding the average of the minimum and the maximum return,
r + r
2
< E¼rs:
For a risk-averse investor with a strictly decreasing marginal utility function u0(¢) similar
results can be deduced which we summarize in a lemma.
Lemma 4.1 A risk-averse and pessimistic investor, i.e., with ¸ = 0, ° > 0; u0(¢)
strictly decreasing, requires an equity premium exceeding the equity premium with risk
but no pessimism,
®(q¤) > ®(q¤0):
Proof. Appendix.
In recent years ‘‘new stock markets’’ have emerged in many developed countries where
stock of start-up firms is traded. These markets were opened in order to provide ven-
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ture capital for new high-risk enterprises with great potential. In the light of the rather
conservative behavior reflected in the equity premium puzzle it is even more surprising
that investors were willing to bet substantial amounts of wealth on firms with no record
of earnings.
Optimism and pessimism as modelled with a neo-additive capacity enables us to explain
such behavior. In fact, we can show that for an arbitrary small degree of optimism there
are maximal returns of a firm high enough to induce a positive stock price for high-risk
firms with potentially high returns. Reconsider the stock market equilibrium price of
Equation (*) and assume, without loss of generality, that the firm’s stock pays off a return
R only in state 1. Hence, r = r1 = R and r = rs = 0 for all s 6= 1: Suppose the expected
return of the firm is bounded away from zero, ¼1 ¢ R ¸ · > 0: Then the equilibrium
price satisfies
q¤ =
1
r
¢ ¸ ¢ u
0(R ¢ A) ¢R + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼1 ¢ u0(R ¢ A) ¢R
° ¢ u0(0) + ¸ ¢ u0(R ¢ A) + (1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢
"
¼1 ¢ u0(R ¢ A)+ P
s6=1
¼s ¢ u0(0)
#
= R
r
¢ u
0(R ¢ A) ¢ [¸ + (1¡ ° ¡¸) ¢ ¼1]
u0(R ¢ A) ¢ [¸ + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼1] + u0(0) ¢ [° ¢ +(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ (1¡ ¼1)]
¸ R
r
¢ [¸ + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼1]
>
R
r
¢ ¸;
where the first inequality follows from u0(0) ¸ u0(R ¢A) and the second strict inequality
from the positive expected return.
It is clear that with some optimism, ¸ > 0; even a vanishing probability of success ¼1
will not deter investors provided the return rises sufficiently,R ¸ ·=¼1:The stock market
price will not collapse. There is no contradiction if investors buy high-risk stock because
of optimism, ¸ > 0; and require an “excessive” equity premium. Adam Smith’s observa-
tion that even “sober people” do play lotteries and Robert Shiller’s observed “exuberance”
in the stock market can be reconciled with rational decision making under uncertainty, if
one allows for optimism and pessimism as modelled by neo-additive capacities.
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5. Behavioral axioms
We present our theory in the context of a variant of Savage’s (1954) purely subjective
uncertainty framework employed by Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) and Ghi-
rardato, Maccherioni, Marinacci & Siniscalchi (2002) (hereafter, GMMS).
The state space S is taken to be the same as was defined in section 2 above. Let X, the
set of outcomes, be a connected and separable topological space. An act is a function
(measurable with respect to E) f : S ! X with finite range, F denotes the set of such
acts and is endowed with the product topology induced by the topology on X. We shall
identify each x 2 X with the constant act, f(s) = x for all s 2 S. For any pair of acts f; g
in F and any event E 2 E , fEg will denote the acth 2 F , formed from the concatenation
of the two acts f and g, in which h (s) equals f (s) if s 2 E , and equals g (s) if s =2 E .
Let % denote the individual’s preference relation on F : For any f 2 F , the certainty
equivalent of f , denoted by m (f ), is the set of constant acts that are indifferent to f .
That is, x 2 m(f), if x » f . Although many constant acts may be equivalent, when there
is no risk of confusion, we shall writem (f) to indicate an arbitrary member of the set.
We say f and g are comonotonic if for every pair of states s and s0 in S , f (s) Â f (s0)
implies g (s) % g (s0).
Adopting Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2001) nomenclature, we say an event
E 2 E is null (respectively, universal ) for a preference relation %, if xEy » y (respec-
tively, xEy » x) for all outcomes x; y 2 X, such that x Â y.4 An event E 2 E , is
essential for % if for some x; y 2 X we have x Â xEy Â y. Let N (respectively, U and
E¤) denote the set of null (respectively, universal and essential) events.
For ease of exposition and without any essential loss of generality we assume there exist
outcomes 0 andM in X, that are, respectively, the ‘‘best ’’ and ‘‘worst ’’ outcomes in X,
in the sense that M Â 0 andM % x % 0 for all x 2 X.
Neo-additive capacities are a special case of the Choquet expected utility theory. In order
to obtain a behavioral characterization, we seek to modify the axioms of GMMS appro-
4 This is weaker than Savage’s original notion of ‘null’ event which requires fEg » g for all f; g 2 F .
23
priately. Their key innovation is to define a behavioral definition of ‘subjective mixtures’
of acts which allows them to define in a Savage framework of purely subjective uncer-
tainty, analogs to axioms based on probability mixtures that play such a key role in the
Anscombe-Aumann framework.
The first axiom requires the preference order to be a complete preorder.
Axiom 1 (Ordering )
The preference relation % on F is complete, reflexive and transitive.
The neo-additive expectedutility representation allows for the discontinuous over-weighting
of events on which extreme, i.e. either best or the worst, outcomes obtain. Hence, stan-
dard continuity with respect to the product topology cannot be expected to hold for the
whole preference relation. Following Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) we only
require a weaker notion of pointwise convergence, where in this product topology, we
say a net ff®g®2D µ F converges pointwise to f 2 F , if and only if f® (s) ! f (s)
for all s 2 S .
Axiom 2 (Continuity ).
Let ff®g®2D µ F be a net that converges pointwise to f and such that all f®s and f are
measurable with respect to the same finite partition.. If f® % g (respectively, g % f®) for
all ® 2 D, then f % g (respectively, g % f).
We also adopt the monotonicity axiom of Chew & Karni (1994) which combines
statewise dominance with a weakening of Savage’s axiom P3.
Axiom 3 (Eventwise Monotonicity ).
For any pair of acts, f; g 2 F , if f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S, then f % g.
In addition, for any triple of outcomes x; y; z 2 X, and any event E 2 E
(a) if E =2 N and x % z, y % z then x Â y) xEz Â yEz;
(b) if E =2 U and z % x, z % y then x Â y ) zEx Â zEy .
As Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) note, Axioms 1 and 3 imply that the sets of
null, universal and essential events form a partition of E .
The next axiom due to Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) builds on the idea of
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Nakamura (1990) and Gul (1992) of a ‘subjective mixture’ of two acts f and g.
Fix some event E , and then construct state by state an act which yields at each state s, the
certainty equivalent of the bet f (s)E g (s). Formally, the statewise (event) E-mixture of
f and g, denoted as fEg, is taken to be the act
fEg (s) =m (f (s)E g (s)) .
Adopting the shorthand fx; yg % z for x % z and y % z, and z %fx; yg for z % x and
z % x, the next axiom may be stated as follows.
Axiom 4 (Binary Comonotonic Act Independence )
For any event A 2 E¤, any eventB 2 E , and for all f; g; h 2 F , such that f = xAy , g =
x0Ay 0, h = x00Ay00. If f; g; h are pairwise comonotonic, and fx; x0g % x00 and fy;y 0g % y00
(or x00 % fx; x0g and y00 % fy; y0g), then
f % g) fBh % gBh.
As its names suggests, Binary Comontonic Act Independence, means that the preference
relation restricted to acts that are measurable with respect to two-element partitions, con-
forms to the theory of Choquet Expected Utility. With these four axioms, Ghirardato
& Marinacci (2001) were able to prove that the preference relation admits what they
dubbed a (canonical) biseparable representation, namely, a Choquet Expected Utility rep-
resentation defined on this restricted set of acts.
Proposition 5.1 (Ghirardato and Marinacci [2001, Theorem 11]) LetX bea connected
and separable topological space and let % be a binary relation on F for which there exist
outcomes 0 and M in X, such that M Â 0 and M % x % 0 for all x 2 X. Then the
following are equivalent:
(i) % satisfies Axioms 1-4 and there exists an essential event A.
(ii) There exists a continuous utility index u : X ! [0; 1] and a capacity º : E ! [0; 1]
such that for all x; y; x0; y 0, such that x % y and x0 % y 0 and all E;E0 2 E
xEy % x0E0y0 , º (E) u (x)+(1 ¡ º (E))u(y) ¸ º (E 0) u (x0)+(1¡ º (E 0))u(y 0): (2)
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Furthermore, if the set of essential events E¤ is non-empty then the capacity in (2) is
unique and the utility index in (2) is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Proposition 5.1 implies that events E 2 E are null if and only if º(E) = 0; universal if
and only if º(E) = 1 and essential if and only if 0 < º(E) < 1 holds.
It remains to impose an appropriate version of an independence-type axiom that extends
the biseparable CEU representation obtained in Proposition 5.1 to the whole domain F
and moreover entails that the capacity in that representation is neo-additive.
To do this, we first need to define GMMS’s notion of a ‘subjective mixture’ of two acts.
We begin with their definition of a ‘preference average’ of two consequences..
Definition 5.1 Fix x; y 2 X, such that x Â y . We say that a consequence z 2 X is a
preference average of x and y (given E) if x % z % y and
xEy »m (xEz)E m (zEy)
Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) show that our Axioms A1 to A4 together with the
connectedness ofX imply that the preference average in Definition 5.1 is well-defined.
The reason for their nomenclature becomes apparent if we consider for a preference rela-
tion that satisfies Axioms 1-4, the preference average of x and y given an essential event
E . From Proposition (5:1) we obtain the equality
º (E) u (x) + (1¡ º (E)) u (y)
= º (E) u (m (xEz)) + (1¡ º (E)) u (m (zEy))
= [º (E)]2 u (x) + 2º (E) (1 ¡ º (E))u (z) + (1 ¡ º (E))2u (y) .
Notice that if the eventE is essential then 0 < º (E) < 1, and so solving foru (z) yields
u (z) =
1
2
u (x) +
1
2
u (y) ,
which is independent of E. We shall therefore denote by (1=2) x©(1=2)y the preference
average of the outcomes x and y. To deliver weighted averages of x and y, we follow
the line of argument detailed in GMMS. That is, by using iterated averages (for example,
(1=2) x © ((1=2) x© (1=2)y) corresponds to a (3=4; 1=4)¡weighted average of x and
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y) and appealing to standard continuity arguments, it is possible to identify, for any ® in
[0;1] and every x and y in X, the weighted preference averages characterized by
u (z) = ®u (x) + (1¡ ®) u (y) . (3)
With slight abuse of notation, we shall let ®x © (1¡ ®) y (or, equivalently, (1¡ ®) y ©
®x) denote an arbitrary element of the indifferent set of outcomes for such preference
averages. We are now in a position to define subjective mixtures of acts.
Definition 5.2 Fix f; g 2 F and ® 2 [0; 1]. A subjective mixture of f and g with
weight ® is any act h 2 F such that h (s) » ®f (s)© (1 ¡ ®)g (s) for each s 2 S .
As GMMS note, all subjective mixtures of f and g with weight ® are state-wise in-
different, and hence by Axiom 3 (i), indifferent. So we follow them and denote by
®f © (1¡ ®) g any one of them.
Our final axiom is key to characterizing the decision maker’s attitudes towards events that
yield extreme outcomes. We first need, however, to define for each act which events the
decision maker views as yielding the extreme outcomes. We begin with preference-based
definitions for the infimum and the supremum of an act.
Definition 5.3 Fix f 2 F . An outcome z 2 X is said to be in the indifference set of the
infimum of f , z 2 infº(f), if for A := f¡1(x : z Â x), zAf » f and if for every y Â z
and B := f¡1(x : y º x), yBf Â f . Similarly, an outcome z 2 X is said to be in the
indifference set of the supremum of f , z 2 supº(f) if for A := f¡1(x : x Â z), zAf » f
and if for every y such that z Â y and B := f¡1(x : x º y), f Â yBf .
Although infº(f) and supº(f ) are defined to be indifference sets of outcomes, when
there is no risk of confusion, we shall write infº(f) and supº(f ) to indicate arbitary
members of these respective sets.
From the definition of a subjective mixture and equation (3) it follows that for every f; g
2 F , ® 2 [0; 1] and s 2 S
u (®f (s) © (1¡ ®) g (s)) = ®u (f (s)) + (1¡ ®) u (g (s)) .
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Hence, if there is a non-null event on which both acts f and g attain their supremum,
that is, the set E =
©
s 2 S : f (s) 2 supº(f)
ª \ ©s 2 S : g (s) 2 supº(g)ª is not null,
then a subjective mixture of these two acts will also attain its supremum on this set. That
is, for any ® in (0; 1), ®f © (1¡ ®) g (s) 2 supº(®f © (1 ¡ ®)g), for all s 2 E.
On the other hand, if the set E is null, then a subjective mixture of these acts need not
necessarily attain its supremum on any state in
©
s 2 S : f (s) 2 supº(f )
ª
nor on any
state in
©
s 2 S : g (s) 2 supº(g)
ª
. In this case, the supremum attained will be less than
that which would have been attained if there had been a common non-null event on which
both acts attained their supremum. Similarly, if the set F = fs 2 S : f (s) Â infº(f)g [
fs 2 S : g (s) Â infº(g)g is not universal, then for any ® 2 (0; 1), ®f © (1¡ ®) g (s)
2 infº(®f © (1 ¡ ®) g), for all s =2 F . While the infimum attained for that subjective
mixture would be no smaller if the set F were universal.
The idea behind the next axiom is that if the decision maker is sensitive about extreme
events, both for good and bad outcomes, then subjective mixtures of acts for which supre-
mum outcomes are obtained on common non-null events will be viewed relatively favor-
ably while subjective mixtures of acts for which infimum outcomes are obtained on a
common event whose complement is not universal will be viewed relatively unfavor-
ably.
To facilitate the formulation of this final axiom, define an act h to be a member of F(f),
if the set of states on which a non-infimum outcome obtains either for h or for f is not
universal. That is,
F(f) := fh 2 Fj fs 2 S : f (s) Â infº(f )g \ fs 2 S : g (s) Â infº(g)g =2 Ug :
Similarly, denote by F(f) the set of acts with some maximum outcomes on a common
non-null event as the act f . That is,
F(f) := ©h 2 Fj ©s 2 S : f (s) 2 supº(f)ª \ ©s 2 S : g (s) 2 supº(g)ª =2 N ª
In GMMS’s axiomatization of Choquet Expected Utility, their key axiom is the restric-
tion of an independence type axiom to subjective mixtures of co-monotonic acts. The
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Choquet integral of a neo-additive capacity satisfies the independence axiom for all acts
with the best and worst outcomes on the same events, respectively. Hence, we effec-
tively strengthen their co-monotonic independence axiom by requiring it to hold for all
acts which obtain their supremum (and, respectively, their infimum) on some common
non-null event in common.
Axiom 5 (Extreme Events Sensitivity )
For any f; g; h 2 F such that f » g and h 2 F(g) \ F(g), and any ® 2 (0; 1],
1. If h 2 F(f ) then ®g© (1 ¡ ®)h % ®f © (1¡ ®)h;
2. If h 2 F(f ) then ®f © (1 ¡ ®)h % ®g © (1¡ ®)h.
Acts that are comonotonic with f are elements of F(f )\F(f ). Hence Axiom 5 implies
comonotonic independence for the indifference relation. In the proof of our representation
result, we show that in conjunction with the other axioms it characterizes a subclass of
the family of Choquet expected utility functionals.
Theorem 5.1 LetX be a connected and separable topological space, let E¤ contain at
least four elements E1; E2; E3 and E4 that together form a partition of S, and let % be a
binary relation on F for which there exist outcomes 0 andM inX , such thatM Â 0 and
M % x % 0 for all x 2 X. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. The preference relation % on F satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Eventwise Monotonic-
ity, Binary Comonotonic Act Independence and Extreme Events Sensitivity.
2. There exists a unique neo-additive capacity º on E and a continuous real-valued func-
tion u on X, unique up to positive affine transformations, such that for all f; g 2 F
f % g ,
Z
u ± f dº ¸
Z
u ± g dº
Proof. Appendix.
Remark: Comparing the conditions of Proposition 3.1 andTheorem 5.1, one maywonder
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why the set of possible events E¤ was required to have at least three non-intersecting
elements but had to have at least four such events in the latter. In Proposition 3.1 three
such events are required to make statement (ii a) meaningful but this statement had not to
be derived. In Theorem 5.1 four non-null and non-universal events are necessary in order
to prove that the capacity º which we deduce satisfies statement (ii a) of Proposition 3.1.
In order to see that four states are necessary for º to satisfy statement (ii a), consider the
following counterexample. The capacity º on S = fs1; s2; s3g defined by
º(s1) = 12 ; º(s2) =
1
3 ; º(s3) =
1
4 ;
º(fs1; s2g) = º(fs1; s3g) = º(fs2; s3g) = 12
satisfies statements (ii b) and (ii c) but not (ii a) of Proposition 3.1 Hence, it is not neo-
additive.
6. Concluding remarks
Optimism and pessimism have long been recognized as important determinants of eco-
nomic behavior. Subjective expected utility theory assumes that the impact of uncertainty
can be reduced to the statistical properties of a probability distribution. This reduction
extends economic analysis to situations under uncertainty where one could rightfully ne-
glect psychological aspects relating to the focal attraction of the best and worst outcome
of economic choices.
In this paper we have introduced a special case of capacity and its Choquet integral which
captures aspects of optimism and pessimism without abandoning the subjectively proba-
bilistic approach all together. In particular, subjective expected utility is always contained
as a special parametric case in this approach. Moreover, as inEichberger & Kelsey
(2000), the additive part of a neo-additive capacity can be determined endogenously in
equilibrium.
Most importantly neo-additive capacities open new avenues of research. It appears nat-
ural to view the degree of confidence which a decision maker holds in a probabilistic
assessment of an uncertain situation as dependent on past experience and subject to inf lu-
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ence from other people’s beliefs. Optimism and pessimism may spread in a population.
Attitudes towards uncertain outcomes may be contagious leading to general swings in
optimism and pessimism. So ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ as observed by Shiller (2001)
may become amenable to formal economic analysis after all.
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Appendix A: Proofs
For notational convenience, let bE := fE 2 Ej 0 < º(E) < 1g.
The following preliminary lemma establishes uniqueness of °; ¸; and ¼:
Lemma: Let º be a capacity on (S; E); where bE contains at least three elements E1, E2,
and E3, such that Ei \Ej = ?, for all i 6= j. Then (°; ¸; ¼) is unique.
Proof. Let (°; ¸; ¼) be a given vector of parameters of º: Denote by ® := 1¡ ° ¡¸ ande¼(E) := ® ¢ ¼(E) for all E 2 E :
For any E;F 2 bE such that E \ F = ; and E [ F 2 bE , e¼(E) is uniquely defined bye¼(E) := º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ):
Assume now that E 2 bE , then there exists (E1; E2) 2 bE £ bE such that E1 \E2 = ; and
E1 [E2 = E: Hence, e¼(E) is uniquely defined by e¼(E) = e¼(E1) + e¼(E2):
This implies that e¼(E) is uniquely defined for all E 2 bE and that ¸ is uniquely defined
by ¸ := º(E) ¡ e¼(E) for all E 2 bE :
Let fEi 2 bEj i = 1; ::; 3g bea partition ofS:Then ® is uniquelydefined by ® := 3P
i=1
e¼(Ei):
Hence, ° is unique. Finally, either ® = 0 and there is no ¼ in the expression of º; or® > 0
and ¼ is uniquely defined for any E 2 bE by ¼(E) := e¼(E)® :
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i) =) (ii). This follows from the definition of a neo-additive capacity.
(ii) =) (i).
(a) First we define a non-negative simple additive measure e¼ on bE :
Case 1: E 2 eE := fE 2 bEj 9 F 2 bE ; E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 bEg:
Define e¼(E) := º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ) for all F 2 bE such that E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 bE .
Property (a) implies that e¼(E) is well-defined.
Case 2: E 2 bE ¡ eE: Hence F = S ¡ E =2 eE and there exists a finite partition of E ,
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fEi 2 eEj i = 1; :::; ng: Define e¼(E) := nP
i=1
e¼(Ei): It is well defined because
nX
i=1
e¼(Ei) = [º(E1 [ ::: [En) ¡ º(E2 [ ::: [En)]
+::::+ [º(En¡1 [En) ¡ º(En)] + e¼(En)
= º(E) ¡ º(En) + e¼(En)
= º(E) ¡ º(F ) + e¼(F ):
Monotonicity of º implies that e¼(E) ¸ 0 for all E 2 bE :
Let us check now:
e¼(E [ F ) = e¼(E) + e¼(F )
for all E;F 2 bE such that E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 bE .
If E [ F 2 bE ¡ eE then this follows directly from Case 2.
IfE[F 2 eE then, forG 2 bE such thatG\(E[F ) = ; andG[(E[F ) 2 bE one obtains
e¼(E [ F ) = º(E [ F [ G) ¡ º(G)
= [º(E [ F [G) ¡ º(F [ G)] + [º(F [ G) ¡ º(G)]
= e¼(E) + e¼(F ):
(b) Next we extend e¼ on all of E to a non-negative simple additive measure.
Clearly, defining e¼(E) = 0 for all E µ Z is consistent with the restricted additivity ofe¼; i.e. e¼(E [ F ) = e¼(E) + e¼(F ) for all E;F 2 E such that E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 bE :
Consider a finite partition of S; fEi 2 bEj i = 1; :::; ng; and define e¼(S) := nP
i=1
e¼(Ei):
To check that e¼(S) is well-defined, let fFj 2 bEj j = 1; :::;mg be another finite partition
of S; then one obtains
e¼(S) : = nX
i=1
e¼(Ei) = nX
i=1
"
mX
j=1
e¼(Ei \ Fj)#
=
mX
j=1
"
nX
i=1
e¼(Ei \ Fj)# = mX
j=1
e¼(Fj):
Let ® := e¼(S): Clearly, ® ¸ 0:
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It remains to prove that e¼(E [F ) = e¼(E) + e¼(F ) for all E;F 2 bE such that E \ F = ;;
E [ F 2 bE : Since bE contains at least three elements, one can assume, without loss of
generality, that E = E1 [ E2 with E1; E2 2 bE; E1 \E2 = ;. Hence, e¼(E) = e¼(E1) +e¼(E2) and, from the definition of e¼(S); the desired result follows.
(c)We prove that there exists ¸ 2 R+ such that º(E) = ¸ + e¼(E) for all E 2 bE :
If E 2 bE ¡ eE then, from Case 2, there exists A 2 bE such that
º(E) = e¼(E) + º(A) ¡ e¼(A):
If E 2 eE then there exists F 2 bE and B 2 E such that E [ F [B = S: Hence, one has
e¼(E [ F ) = º(E [ F ) + º(B) ¡ e¼(B);
and, therefore,
e¼(E) + e¼(F ) = º(E [ F ) ¡ º(E) + º(E) + e¼(B) ¡ º(B);
which gives
º(E) = e¼(E) + º(B) ¡ e¼(B):
Hence,
º(A)¡ e¼(A) = º(B)¡ e¼(B)
for all A;B 2 bE :
It remains to check that the common value ¸ := º(A) ¡ e¼(A) is non-negative. Let
E;F 2 bE satisfy Property (b) and consider A ½ E and B ½ F: Applying Property (a)
twice gives
0 · º(E) + º(F ) ¡ º(E [ F ) = º(A) + º(B) ¡ º(A [B)
= º(A) ¡ e¼(A) = ¸:
(d)We prove that ® + ¸ · 1.
By Property (c), there is E;F 2 bE such that
0 · º(E) + º(F )¡ º(E [ F )
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= 1¡ º(S ¡ E)¡ º(S ¡ F ) + º(S ¡ (E [ F ))
= 1¡ (¸ + e¼(S ¡ E))¡ (¸ + e¼(S ¡ F )) + (¸ + e¼(S ¡ (E [ F )))
= 1¡ ¸ ¡ ®:
(e) Setting ° := 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ ®; we finally obtain: º(E) = ° ¢ ¹0(E) + ¸ ¢ ¹1(E) + (1 ¡
° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼(E) for all E 2 E where, for 1¡ ° ¡ ¸ > 0; the probability measure ¼(E) is
defined by ¼(E) := 11¡°¡¸ ¢ e¼(E):
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. From Equation (*), we get
q¤ =
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r + (1 ¡ °)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) ¢ rs
r ¢
·
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) + (1 ¡ °)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
=
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r + (1 ¡ °) ¢
·
r ¢ q¤0¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
r ¢
·
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) + (1¡ °)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
<
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r ¢ q¤0 + (1 ¡ °) ¢
·
r ¢ q¤0¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
r ¢
·
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) + (1 ¡ °)¢ P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
= q¤0:
The inequality follows because
r ¢ q¤0 =
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) ¢ rsP
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) < r:
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We begin with an observation and a couple of preliminary results. The observation is that
any act f 2 F may be expressed as [x1 on E1; : : : ; xn on En], where fE1; : : : ; Eng is the
coarsest finite %-ordered partition of S with respect to which f measurable. By that we
mean for any pair of states s; t 2 S, if both s and t are in some E 2 fE1; : : : ; Eng
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then f (s) = f (t), otherwise f (s) 6= f (t). Furthermore for any s 2 Ei and t 2
Ej , i < j implies f (s) % f (t). Throughout this proof, if an act is expressed in the
form [x1 on E1; : : : ; xn on En] then it should be taken as given that xi % xi+1, for
i = 1; : : : ; i ¡ 1. We also note that Axiom 5 (Extreme Events Sensitivity) and Axiom
1 (Ordering) imply that if the preference relation expresses indifference between two co-
monotonic acts then indifference is preserved when those two acts are each mixed with a
third act that is pairwise co-monotonic with both.
Lemma: (Comonotonic Independence of Indifference) Axiom 5 implies that % satisfies
the following independence property for pairwise comonotonic acts. For any ® 2 [0; 1]
and any three acts f; g; h 2 F , that are pairwise comonotonic, if f » g then ®f ©
(1 ¡ ®)h » ®g © (1 ¡ ®) h.
Proof : From the pairwise co-monotonicity of h with both f and g, it follows that h 2
F(g) \ F(g) and h 2 F(f) \ F(f). Hence Axiom 5 implies that ®f © (1¡ ®) h %
®g © (1¡ ®) h and ®g © (1¡ ®) h % ®f © (1¡ ®) h, as required. ¤
Finally we report GMMS’s result (2002, Proposition 6) that the triple (X;»;©) consti-
tutes a mixture set. That is, for allx; y 2 X and all®; ¯ in [0; 1], (M0)®x©(1¡ ®) y ½ X,
(M1) x 2 (1x © 0y), (M2) ®x © (1¡ ®) y = (1¡ ®) y © ®x (commutative law), and
(M3) ¯ (®x© (1¡ ®) y) © (1¡ ¯)y = ®¯x © (1¡ ®¯)y (distributive law). Applying
this result state by state, to Definition 5.2 (the definition of a subjective mixture of f and
g with weight ® in [0; 1]) it readily follows that the triple (F ;»;©) is also a mixture set
and hence exhibits the analogous properties.
Proof of Theorem 5.1-
1. Sufficiency
We first show that % has a CEU representation, Part (i), and then that the capacity is
neo-additive, Part (ii).
Part (i) : % admits a CEU-representation. Let u (:) and º (:) be the continuous utility
index and capacity of the canonical biseperable representation that from Proposition (5:1)
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we know % admits. Recall that u (:) represents % restricted to the constant acts, and that
V ([x1 on E ; x2 on S ¡ E]) = º (E) u (x1) + (1 ¡ º (E))u (x2) represents % restricted
to the set of acts that are measurable with respect to a two-element partition of S.
Fix, f = [x1 on E1; : : : ; xn on En]. For each i = 1; : : : ; n, it follows from the definition
of © and the connectedness of X, that there exists a unique ¸i 2 [0; 1] for which xi 2
¸iM © (1¡ ¸i) 0 and a unique ºi for which
[M on E1 [ : : : [ Ei; 0 on Ei+1 [ : : : [ En] » ºiM © (1 ¡ º i)0.
Equation (3) implies that 1 ¸ ¸1 ¸ : : : ¸ ¸n ¸ 0 and 0 · º1 · : : : · ºn¡1 · 1.
Hence we have, by construction and the mixture set properties of (F ;»;©) that
f =
24 x1 on E1... ...
xn on En
35 =
24 ¸1M © (1 ¡¸1) 0 on E1... ...
¸nM © (1 ¡¸n) 0 on En
35
= (1¡ ¸1)
26666664
0 on E1
0 on E2
0 on E3
...
...
0 on En¡1
0 on En
37777775©(¸1 ¡ ¸2)
26666664
M on E1
0 on E2
0 on E3
...
...
0 on En¡1
0 on En
37777775©(¸2 ¡ ¸3)
26666664
M on E1
M on E2
0 on E3
...
...
0 on En¡1
0 on En
37777775
© ¢ ¢ ¢ © (¸n¡1 ¡ ¸n)
26666664
M on E1
M on E2
M on E3
...
...
M on En¡1
0 on En
37777775 © ¸n
26666664
M on E1
M on E2
M on E3
...
...
M on En¡1
M on En
37777775
By applying the comonotonic independence of indifference property of Lemma 6.3 n¡1
times and utilizing the distributive law of (F ;»;©), we obtain
f » (1¡ ¸1) 0© (¸1 ¡ ¸2) [º1M © (1¡ º1) 0] © (¸2 ¡ ¸3) [º2M © (1¡ º2) 0]
© : : :© (¸n¡1 ¡ ¸n) [ºn¡1M © (1¡ ºn¡1)0] © ¸nM
=
"
n¡1X
i=1
(¸i ¡ ¸i+1)º i + ¸n
#
M ©
"
1¡ ¸n ¡
n¡1X
i=1
(¸i ¡ ¸i+1) º i
#
±0.
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Hence it follows from equation (3) that for any pair of acts
f =
24 x1 on E1... ...
xn on En
35 and f 0 =
24 x01 onE 01... ...
x0n0 on E 0n0
35
applying the above methods we have
f % f 0 if and only if"
n¡1X
i=1
(¸i ¡ ¸i+1)º i + ¸n
#
¸
"
n0¡1X
j=1
¡
¸0j ¡ ¸0j+1
¢
º0i + ¸
0
n
#
By construction, u (0) = 0, u (M) = 1, u (xi) = ¸i, º (;) := 0, º (S) := 1 and
º
¡[ij=1Ei¢ = º i. Thus we have established that % can be represented by the Choquet
expected utility functional
CEU
0@24 x1 on E1... ...
xn on En
351A = n¡1X
i=1
(u (xi) ¡ u (xi+1)) º
¡[ij=1Ej¢ + u (xn)
as required.
Part (ii) : º satisfies conditions (ii) of Proposition 3.1.
(a) We prove that for any three events (E;F;G) 2 E¤ £E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = ; =
E \ G, E [ F =2 U, E [ G =2 U .
º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ) = º(E [G) ¡ º(G);
Since there are at least four pairwise disjoint events in E¤; we can assume that there are
E;F;G 2 E¤ £ E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = E \ G = F \ G = ; and E [ F [G =2 U.
The following lemma contains the key argument.
Lemma: If there are E¤ £ E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = E \ G = F \ G = ; and
E [ F [ G =2 U. Then
º(E [ F [G) ¡ º(F [G) = º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ): (*)
Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, º(E [ F ) · º(F [ G) and let ¯ 2 [0; 1] be
such that º(E [ F ) = ¯ ¢ º(F [ G): Consider
f : =
·
M on E [ F
0 on S ¡ (E [ F )
¸
;
38
g : =
·
¯ ¢M © (1¡ ¯) ¢ 0 on F [G
0 on S ¡ (F [G)
¸
;
h : =
·
M on F [G
0 on S ¡ (F [G)
¸
:
Clearly, f » g; h 2 F(f) \ F(f) and h 2 F(g) \ F(g): By Axiom 5, Extreme Event
Sensitivity, we have
1
2
¢ g © 1
2
¢ h » 1
2
¢ f © 1
2
¢ h:
Hence,
1
2
¢ [º(E [ F [G) + º(F )] = 1
2
¢ (1 + ¯) ¢ º(F [ G)
=
1
2
¢ (º(F [G) + º(E [ F )) :
Thus, weconclude º(E[F[G)¡º(F[G) = º(E[F )¡º(F ): ¤
Let us now show that (E;F;G) 2 E¤ £ E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = ; = E \ G;
E [ F =2 U, E [ G =2 U implies
º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ) = º(E [G) ¡ º(G):
Several cases have to be considered when F 6= G:
Case 1.1 : F ½ G: Using Equation (*), we get
º(E [ G)¡ º(G) = º(E [ F [ (G¡ F )) ¡ º(F [ (G¡ F ))
= º(E [ F )¡ º(F ):
Case 1.2 : G ½ F: Similar to Case 1.1.
Case 2.1 : F ¡G 6= ; 6= G¡ F and F \G 6= ; Using Equation (*), we get
º(E [ F )¡ º(F ) = º(E [ (F \G) [ (F ¡G)) ¡ º((F \G) [ (F ¡G))
= º(E [ (F \G)) ¡ º(F \G)
= º(E [ (F \G) [ (G¡ F )) ¡ º((F \G) [ (G¡ F ))
= º(E [G) ¡ º(G):
Case 2.2 : F ¡ G 6= ; 6= G ¡ F and F \ G = ; If E [ F [ G =2 U , then the result
follows immediately from Equation (*).
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Suppose E [ F [G 2 U . Since E¤ contains at least four elements we may assume that
one of the eventsE;F orG can be partitioned into two events. Without loss of generality,
suppose E can be partitioned into E1 and E2. Then Equation (*) implies
º(E [ F ) ¡ º(F ) = º(E1 [E2 [ F )¡ º(F )
= [º(E1 [E2 [ F ) ¡ º(E1 [ F )] + [º(E1 [ F )¡ º(F )]
= [º(E2 [ F ) ¡ º(F )] + [º(E1 [ F )¡ º(F )]
= [º(E2 [G)¡ º(G)] + [º(E1 [ G)¡ º(G)]
= [º(E1 [E2 [G) ¡ º(E1 [G)] + [º(E1 [ G) ¡ º(G)]
= º(E [ G)¡ º(G):
(b) We prove that for some (E;F ) 2 E¤£ E¤ such that E \ F = ; and E [ F =2 U,
º(E [ F ) · º(E) + º(F ):
Consider (E;F ) 2 E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = ; and E [ F =2 U. Assume, without loss
of generality, that º(E) = ¯ ¢ º(F ) for some ¯ 2 [0; 1]: Let
f : =
·
M on E
0 on S ¡ E
¸
;
g : =
·
¯ ¢M © (1¡ ¯) ¢ 0 on F
0 on S ¡ F
¸
;
h : =
·
M on F
0 on S ¡ F
¸
:
Clearly, f » g; h 2 F(f ) and h 2 F(g) \ F(g): By Axiom 5(1), Extreme Event
Sensitivity, we have
1
2
¢ g+ 1
2
¢ h º 1
2
¢ f + 1
2
¢ h:
Hence,
1
2 ¢ º(E [ F ) ·
1
2 ¢ (1 + ¯) ¢ º(F )
=
1
2
¢ (º(F ) + º(E)) :
Thus, we conclude º(E [ F ) · º(E) + º(F ):
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(c) We prove that for some (E;F ) 2 E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = ; and E [ F =2 U ,
º(E [ F ) · º(E) + º(F ):
Consider (E;F ) 2 E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = ; and E [ F =2 U. Assume, without loss
of generality, that º(S ¡ E) = ¯ ¢ º(S ¡ F ) for some ¯ 2 [0; 1]: Let
f : =
·
M on S ¡ E
0 on E
¸
;
g : =
·
¯ ¢M © (1¡ ¯) ¢ 0 on S ¡ F
0 on F
¸
;
h : =
·
M on S ¡ F
0 on F
¸
:
Clearly, f » g; h 2 F(f ) and h 2 F(g) \ F(g): By Axiom 5(2), Extreme Event
Sensitivity, we have
1
2
¢ f + 1
2
¢ h º 1
2
¢ g + 1
2
¢ h:
Hence,
1
2
+
1
2
¢ º((S ¡ E) [ (S ¡ F )) ¸ 1
2
¢ (1 + ¯) ¢ º(S ¡ F )
=
1
2
¢ (º(S ¡ F ) + º(S ¡ E))
or
1
2
¢ [(1¡ º(S ¡ F )) + (1 ¡ º(S ¡ E))] ¸ 1
2
¢ [1¡ º((S ¡ E) [ (S ¡ F ))] :
Thus, we conclude º(E [ F ) · º(E) + º(F ):
2. Necessity.
The necessity of the representation follows straightforwardly from the definition of the
neo-additive representation and so the proof is omitted.
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